

Chinese Financial Deregulations: Review and Prospects

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1. Introduction

China's financial sector has undergone substantial changes over the past two decades.

First, it has been transformed from a state-owned, mono-banking system to a diversified, modern financial system since the early 1980s.

Second, government controls over financial institutions, interest rates and exchange rates have also been relaxed.

Third, the credit plan has become more indicative in nature rather than binding.

Therefore, the process of financial deregulation in China has been extensive and complicated with a gradual approach.

This paper tends to review it systematically and evaluate the impact of China's financial deregulations on economic growth and the operation of the financial sector.

This provides a platform to analyze the efficiency of Chinese financial deregulation, consider the current problems, analyze likely future developments and develops a response to meet the future challenges. 2. Overview on Financial Deregulation

2.1 Increasing Independence of the Central Bank and Institutional Diversification

The reform of financial sector, like other sectors, took a gradual approach, including three stages: Stage I reform transformed the monobank system to a two-tier system with the PBC playing the role of central bank. Stage II reform established three

policy banks and improved the autonomy of SOBs.

Stage III reform created the RCBs and UCBs on the basis of the rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) and the urban credit cooperatives (UCCs). 2.2 The Evolution of Credit Allocation System and Removal of Credit quotas

Before 1978 the allocation of credit was arranged through the PBC and its branches according to the credit plan, which was prepared in the form of a source-and-use-offunds balance statement to match the estimation of the demand for physical resources. During the 1990s the overall trend has been away from direct controls and by 1995 only the major SOBs remained subject to any credit quotas.

The PBC removed the credit quotas for the SOBs in March 1998, replacing it with asset-liability ratios management principles.

2.3 Liberalization of Interest Rates

China took a cautious approach to liberalize the planned interest rates.

The measure adopted was to raise the interest rate and allowed considerable flexibility with respect to setting interest rates.

In 1979 an attempt was made to raise the interest rate to its pre-cultural revolution level.

From 1980-1989, the government made nine upward adjustments to deposit and loan rates.

In late 1980s banks were allowed to adjust lending interest rates within a certain margin below and above the administered rate. From 1990-1992, the government unexpectedly reduced deposit and loan rates three times.

Starting in 1992, the non-state financial instruments like corporate bonds and stocks began developing quickly.

In October 1993 the 3rd Plenum of the 14th CPC national congress pointed out that "the central bank shall promptly adjust benchmark interest rate according to changes in market supply and demand, and allow the commercial banks to flexibly set their own rate on loans and deposit within a specified range".

From May 1996, against the background of a price slide and effective macroeconomic adjustment, the PBC has cut the deposit and lending rates on nine occasions.

2.4 Transition from Direct Control to Indirect Regulation

With the credit quotas on commercial banks eliminated in 1998, a new intermediate target system has been established which focuses on the monetary base as an operating target and the money supply as an intermediate target.

Instruments of monetary policies such as reserve requirement system, rediscounting operations and open market operations had made rapid progress. 2.5 Decentralization and Separation in the financial Regulatory System

State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) established in 1992

Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) established in 1993

China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) established in 1998

China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) established in 2003 3. An Evaluation of Financial Sector Deregulation

3.1 Macro-Evidence

Rapidly Expanding Financial Assets
Table below shows the changes of

financial structure during 1980-2003.


The Structure of Financial Assets (100,000,000 yuan)

		Total	Total	Borrowing		Capitalization	Insurance	Total
Year	M0	Deposit	Loans	by MOF	Bonds	(A, B shares)	Premiums	Assets
1980	346.20	1661.20	2414.30	170.20	258.44			4850.34
1982	439.10	2369.90	3180.60	170.20	258.44			6418.24
1984	792.10	3583.90	4766.10	260.50	258.44			9661.04
1986	1218.40	5354.70	7590.80	370.10	339.60		42.35	14915.95
1988	2134.00	7425.80	10551.30	576.50	935.87	35.00	94.76	21753.23
1990	2644.40	14012.60	17680.70	801.00	1343.40	45.90	155.76	36683.76
1992	4336.00	23468.00	26322.90	1241.10	2540.15	1048.13	335.15	59291.43
1994	7288.60	40473.00	40658.30	1687.10	3927.59	3690.62	376.41	98101.12
1996	8802.00	68571.00	61152.80	1582.10	7379.61	9842.00	538.30	157868.01
1998	11204.20	95698.00	86524.10	1582.10	13822.26	19506.00	1255.90	229592.46
2000	14652.70	123804.00	99371.07	1582.10	21265.00	48091.00	1598.00	303635.22
2001	15688.80	143617.00	112315.00	1582.10	25161.11	43522.00	2109.00	343995.01
2002	17278.00	183388.00	139803.00	1582.10	29390.20	38329.00	3053.00	412823.30
2003	19746.00	220364.00	169771.00	1582.10	22603.00	42578.00	3880.00	480524.10

Sources: China Statistics Yearbook, China Financial Yearbook and People's Bank of China Statistics Quarterly bulletin.

Increasing Financial Depth While Imbalanced Financial Structure

Financial Deepening: M2/GDP (%)



Sources: ACFB various years and http://www.stats.gov.cn


the Variation and Structure of Financial Interrelated Ratio (FIR) in China


Year	M2/GNP	L/GNP	S/GNP	FIR
1979	36.10	52.70	0.10	88.90
1981	46.00	60.40	1.20	107.60
1983	51.60	60.90	2.50	115.01
1985	57.80	70.00	3.10	130.90
1987	69.80	82.00	5.30	157.10
1989	70.60	84.90	7.40	162.90
1991	89.70	98.70	9.30	197.90
1993	91.10	95.30	19.40	205.90
1995	105.70	87.40	19.20	212.00
1997	124.40	102.40	38.20	265.10
1999	144.13	112.67	43.80	300.60

Sources: Zhang (1998).

High-speed Economic Growth but Widening Income Disparities

Real GDP Growth, Investment Rate and Saving Rate During 1978-2003







High Saving Rate while underutilization

year	Government Budget		Domestic Credit		Foreign	Capital	Self-owned capital and others	
	Amount	Share	Amount	Share	Amount	Share	Amount	Share
1981	269.76	28.10	122.00	12.70	36.36	3.80	532.89	55.40
1983	339.71	23.80	175.50	12.30	66.55	4.70	848.30	59.20
1985	407.80	16.00	510.27	20.10	91.48	3.60	1533.64	60.30
1987	496.64	13.10	871.98	23.00	181.97	4.80	2241.11	59.10
1989	366.05	8.30	762.98	17.30	291.08	6.60	2990.28	67.80
1991	380.43	6.80	1314.73	23.50	318.89	5.70	3580.44	64.00
1993	483.67	3.70	3071.99	23.50	954.28	7.30	8562.36	65.50
1995	621.05	3.00	4198.73	20.50	2295.89	11.20	13409.19	65.30
1997	696.74	2.80	4782.55	18.90	2683.89	10.60	17096.49	67.70
1999	1852.14	6.20	5725.93	19.20	2006.78	6.70	20169.80	67.80
2001	2546.42	6.70	7239.79	19.10	1730.73	4.60	26470.04	69.60

Under-utilization of Domestic Savings During 1982-2001




Loan-deposit Ratios During 1981-2003



3.2. Micro-evidence


Rising Real Interest Rates

The Fluctuation of Nominal Interest Rate and Real Interest Rate



Trends of Nominal and Real Interest Rate during 1979-2003

Interest Rate Spread



Per Cent

Concentration in the Banking Sector and Rising Competition

The Market Share of China's Banking Sector 1994-2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1H2003	
Loans (% of Total Assets)											
SOBs	80.8	79.6	75.3	76.1	75.9	75.6	74.1	69.8	71.8	65.9	
OCBs	19.2	20.4	24.7	23.9	25.1	24.4	25.9	30.2	28.2	34.1	
	Deposits (% of Total Assets)										
SOBs	na	na	68.7	68.9	68.7	69.5	68.4	66.8	69.9	65.7	
OCBs	na	na	31.3	31.1	31.3	30.5	31.6	33.2	30.1	34.3	

Herfindahl Index, 1996-2000

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Herfindahl Index (deposits based)					
The number of SOBs anf OCBs	14.0	16.0	19.0	20.0	17.0
The number of OCBs	10.0	12.0	15.0	16.0	13.0
SOBs and OCBs	22.8	21.3	21.0	21.1	20.4
OCBs	29.4	23.9	19.0	11.1	12.1
Herfindahl Index (asset Based)	~		-		-
SOBs and OCBs	24.2	21.0	20.5	19.6	19.4
OCBs	26.9	20.2	17.8	14.6	14.7

Performance of the Banks

By measuring profitability, capital adequacy, loan-loss reserves relative to loans and NPLs, the performance and health of the financial sector has deteriorated in recent years.

1 poor profitability

Profitability of the Banks


-									
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Interes	t Incon	ne /Tota	al Incor	ne (%)					
SOBs	85	97.3	96.3	97.7	97.6	96.7	96	_	_
OCBs	86.5	90	88.4	89.8	92.5	90.8	90.4	_	_
Income	· (%)	-		-	-	-	- 0		
SOBs	_	3.1	2.3	1.7	2.2	2.8	3.8	_	_
OCBs	7.4	7.3	9.3	6.6	5	8.6	8.4	_	_
Net Interest Income /Total Income (%)									
SOBs	3.1	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.3	1.9	1.8	 _	
OCBs	2.5	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.1	2.3	2.2	_	_
Interes	t Exper		/Total]	Expendi	iture ('		-	~	
SOBs	62	84.9	81.9	80.2	67.3	65.6	63.1	_	_
OCBs	72.5	70.4	67.3	68	60.8	59.6	55.3	_	_
Other]		0	0	xpendit	-	-	-		
SOBs	38	15.1	18.1	19.8	32.7	34.4	36.9	_	_
OCBs	27.5	29.6	32.7	32	39.2	40.4	44.7	_	_
Profit a	-				-		-	°.	
SOBs	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
OCBs	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.3
Profit a	÷	°				-	-		·
SOBs	7.8	12.2	12.1	5.7	2.9		2.75	3.2	3.5
OCBs	12.2	_					11.6	11.9	11.4
0.000								//	

② Low Capital Adequacy Capital Adequacy Ratios and Loan Loss Reserve

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002		
Capital Plus Reserve/ Total Assets (%)											
SOBs	3.5	3.3	3	3.2	5.8	5.4	5.3				
OCBs	8.8	6.4	8.2	6.8	9.5	8.4	5.3				
	Loan Loss Reserve/Loans (%)										
SOBs	0.5	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.2	1	1.87	2.04		
OCBs	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.4	3.49	2.69		



The Growth of Total Loans and GDP in China



4 Deficiencies of the Standard Evaluation of the SOBs' Performance

First, the SOBs have been labeled commercial in name while different from the typical commercial banks in Western countries

Second, financial performance is a poor guide to internal efficiency.

Third, financial performance of SOBs is a poor guide to the development impact of lending.


Finally, Solely using measures of solvency such as capital adequacy ratios to determine the long-term soundness of SOBs is misleading

4. Lessons of China's Financial Sector Deregulation

(1) the poor and deteriorating performance of SOEs held back drastic financial reforms.

(2) the ownership of SOBs has not changed and the intervention by the central government in banks' resource allocation remains. (3) the balance sheets of SOBs have remained weak.

(4) the SOBs did not follow international norms during the process of the transformation into genuine commercial banks



The competitive pressures on the SOBs by foreign banks

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